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Abstract
The authors contrast two political inquiries in light of Luhmann’s system theory of
procedure. The article asks whether and to what extent these inquiries can be
considered as procedural systems, meaning as distinct frames of action that generate
specific meanings and relevancies. Starting from the micro-sociological analysis of
interactions in the British ‘‘Hutton Inquiry’’ and the European Union’s ‘‘CIA
Inquiry’’ the authors reconstruct the specific functionalities of each with regard to
their different ways of engaging and enabling self-referential processes of commu-
nication, knowledge production, and decision-making. As a system, each merges
these three processes into a consistent, relatively strong or weak procedure, but they
do so to different degrees. Overall, the article encourages a sociological understand-
ing of the procedural mechanism as well as an empirical qualification and variation
of system-theoretical assertions.
Keywords: Procedure; System; Parliamentary inquiry; Interaction; Discourse.
I. A sociological understanding of procedure
A t t e n d a n t o n t h e g l o b a l ‘‘war on terror’’, Western
democracies established a number of political inquiries. Objects of
inquiry and discussion are issues such as the decision to go to war in
Iraq, the incarceration of ‘‘terrorists’’, the operation of secret de-
tention camps and further alleged instances of misconduct by state
authorities. We take these inquiries as a starting point to illuminate
their modes of operation from a micro-sociological perspective. We
ask how these inquiries process their respective terms of reference
emanating from parliamentary or governmental authorities. For
example, how do the ‘‘Hutton Inquiry’’, commissioned by the British
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government, and the ‘‘CIA Inquiry’’, commissioned by the European
Parliament, operate? We compare the inquiries’ respective modes of
operation using the published protocols and documents. We use our
empirical results to discuss the analytic question whether and to what
degree the inquiries display properties of (self-referential, distinct and
integrated) procedural systems, as defined by Luhmann – and as
opposed to, e.g., rituals or mere gatherings. The comparison shows
that, viewed sociologically, both display certain properties of procedure,
albeit to different degrees. On the basis of these results, we aim to give
empirical weight to Luhmann’s system theory of procedure. In partic-
ular, our results serve to both illustrate and specify Luhmann’s
theoretical notion of ‘‘procedural systems’’.
1. On the procedural analysis of political inquiries
The literature on the operation of inquiry committees is extensive.
In political science and constitutional law, political inquiries are
discussed with regard to the functions they fulfil within the demo-
cratic polity. Accordingly, in this perspective, inquiries serve such
purposes as: controlling the work of government (Claveloux 1983;
Aberbach 1986; Alba 1995; Baumgarten 2000; H€opfner 2004); con-
taining scandals (Germis 1988); binding public attention (Willems et
al. 1993); or re-establishing tarnished reputations (Ziemske 1991;
Rozell and Wilcox 2000; Blaney 2001). On the whole, there are few
sociological works on inquiry committees, exemplified by analyses
such as Alexander’s (1989) of the ‘‘Watergate’’ inquiry and Lynch and
Bogen’s (1996) work on the ‘‘Iran-Contra’’ hearings. Alexander
describes the Watergate hearings’ social function in terms of a ritual
renewal and purification of US society. Based on the TV coverage
from the ‘‘Iran-Contra hearings’’, Lynch and Bogen analyse the
pragmatics of memory work in the inquiry, including its systematic
limitations. The ‘‘making of history’’ thus acquires a dual character:
on the one hand, it emerges as the practical and public reconstruction
of the history of a secret and illegal weapons deal; on the other, as
a historically charged spectacle of recent US history itself.
In this respect, research on committees of inquiry proceeds in an
analogous manner to research on procedure more generally. A ‘‘pro-
cedure’’ is defined and evaluated in legal terms. An important frame of
reference in current legal and political scholarship on procedure is the
difference between adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems. In this
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line of thinking, procedural designs are evaluated according to the
norms of decision and standards of evidence they imply: in adversarial
procedure, the search for and submission of evidence, examination of
witnesses, and the assertion of claims are dominated by the parties,
and decisions are generally reached by way of a ‘‘common sense’’
logic. Inquisitorial procedural designs, on the other hand, rely on an
authoritative figure, such as a judge or government official, guiding
the ‘‘search for the truth’’ ‘‘from above’’, and decisions are made
according to an administrative logic. Thus, in the adversarial pro-
cedure ‘‘authority is fragmented and [. . .] hierarchical control is
relatively weak’’, while in inquisitorial procedure ‘‘legal authority
and decision-making is hierarchically organised and disputants [. . .]
play a more restrained role’’ (Kagan 2006, p. 5).
Considering the prevalence of the adversarial/inquisitorial distinc-
tion, it is not surprising that many recent works on the design and
operation of procedure focus on the relative advantages and disadvan-
tages of these two procedural types (Kritzer 2004, p. 367, pp. 376-77).
Similarly, evaluations of a given procedure often rely on the adversarial/
inquisitorial distinction and proceed from there to look at the respective
‘‘other’’ type as a source of innovation (Kagan 2006; Br€acklein 2006).
Politico-legal scholarship liberally applies those same criteria to com-
mittees of inquiry to argue for a need for reform (Schr€oder 1988;
Ziemske 1991; Morlok 2000; Weisgerber 2003) or to assess the
effectiveness and desirability of amendments (Schr€oder 1989, 2000).
There is also much concern with the legal limits of inquiries, e.g., vis-à-
vis the executive (Baumgarten 2000; Rozell 2002), the media (Mangan
1994), lawyer-client interactions (Rich 1988; Chud 1999), or private
persons (O’Neill 2002). The common denominator of these works is
that the analysis of procedure proceeds from the rules of procedure.
This ‘‘norm-bias’’ (Vollmer 1996) is not confined to legal and political
scholarship; it also pervades sociological or socio-legal thinking about
procedure. Commonly, a procedure is evaluated according to normative
criteria such as those of discourse ethics (Apel and Kettner 1992; Bal
1994), procedural justice (Epp 1998), public access (Bora 1999), or the
acceptance of outcomes (Machura 2001). However, a procedure and its
rules of procedure are not one and the same. The former is much more:
a ‘‘social system’’ (Luhmann 1969, p. 41), a ‘‘partially self-governing,
complexity-reducing framework of action’’ (ibid.); a ‘‘matrix of possible
events that can only occur with their specific meanings in this procedure’’
(ibid. p. 45, translations are my own, JS). Here, Luhmann lays the
foundations for a sociological concept of procedure emancipated from law.
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Besides separating procedure from legal norms, Luhmann also
redefined the relation between the two. Legitimation durch Verfahren
[Legitimisation by Procedure] offers a sociological understanding
of legal norms next to a dynamic model of decision. Legal norms
are integrated into the operation of procedure as ‘‘social systems
serving a specific function, which is to arrive at a singular binding
decision, and which are therefore restricted in their duration from the
beginning’’ (Luhmann, 1969, p. 41, translation JS). During this
limited time, a complex, self-referential microcosm unfolds dis-
engaged from everyday life. Here, nuances and details gain currency
which seem irrelevant from the ‘‘outside’’. The general critique of
Legitimation durch Verfahren (Treiber 1986; Machura 1993; R€ohl and
Machura 1997) was rather focussed on Luhmann’s concept of
legitimisation. By contrast, we consider the crucial innovation to be
Luhmann’s sociological concept of procedure (Rosenfield 1998;
Ziegert 2002). In this paper, we push this sociological turn by
describing procedure as the interplay of self-referential and contin-
gent processes of decision-making, communication and knowledge
production. This serves to establish a notion of procedure which does
not function as the antonym of informality, but rather as the opposite
of ritual (i.e., as contingent). This also serves to qualify other common
interpretative frames (Luhmann 1969, p. 175): the procedure is not
the same as a single session of the inquiry, or interaction among co-
present actors, even if performances do matter a great deal; it is not
identical to the rules of procedure, even if these are followed, called
upon, or established in the procedure itself; neither is it identical to
parliament or the committee dealing with the issue, even if the
procedure involves political organisations. Thus, our starting hypoth-
esis reads: participants are only able to act issue-oriented, and their
doings can only be reconstructed adequately with reference to the
specific procedure in question and its current state. We aim to show
that and in how far the political inquiries in question are actually
conducted as a (contingent, self-referential and fenced-in) procedure,
which in turn unfold their own retrospective and prospective refer-
ences, roles and demands, as well as ‘‘good reasons’’ and powers of
judgement.
We connect Luhmann’s notion of procedure as a social system to
three further strands in sociological research:
a) to the ethnomethodological conversation analysis of pre-structured
verbal exchanges in institutional settings, such as law courts, doctors’
offices, or parliaments;
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b) to ethnographic laboratory studies on the socio-material and
discourse-practical organisation of knowledge production and episte-
mic cultures;
c) to theories of decision-making from the sociology of organisa-
tions, explaining the sequential generation of previously contingent,
currently binding and prospectively definitive decisions.
Each of these research traditions provides empirical criteria to
assess self-reference and autonomy. We ask (a) how participants
communicate in the hearings (b) to establish the facts (c) which then
provide the basis for a definitive judgment.
2. Do three processes make a procedure?
Starting from a micro-sociological analysis of question/answer
exchanges, we are going to address the inquiries’ degrees of self-
reference and integration with regard to their respective (self-)
enacted knowledges and their (self-) founded decisions. We measure
‘‘procedurality’’ according to the following considerations.
a) Communicative connections. Conversation analysis emphasises the
sequential structuring of hearings and testimonies. According to this
view, meaningful contributions result from successive, coordinated
and methodical production. Studies on ‘‘talk at work’’ (Drew and
Heritage 1992) in general and, more particularly, ‘‘courtroom studies’’
(Atkinson and Drew 1979) have developed further relevant pre-
structuring elements shaping the local course of conversation. Con-
ditions such as ‘‘multi-party’’ figurations, ‘‘overhearing audiences’’, or
the ‘‘pre-allocation’’ of turns are important concepts here. In general,
conversation analysis requires restraint in interpretation: the aim is to
reconstruct the successive construction of meaning by the partici-
pants; roles and rules only gain relevance in the course of conversa-
tion; even seemingly simple definitions, such as the beginning and end
of a hearing are produced by the participants themselves. Luhmann
assumes a similar self-reference for procedure in general: ‘‘The
beginning and the end are markers that are produced by the
proceedings, that is, which are identified recursively in the manage-
ment of the proceedings’’ (Luhmann 2004, p. 206). With a view to
procedurality, this poses the question, whether and in how far
participants’ retrospective and prospective contributions integrate
one procedure, and how participants render their contributions as
contributions to the procedure. Conversely, one could ask whether the
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interrogations are merely disconnected events. This leads us to a first
necessary (but not sufficient) condition in our definition of procedure
– an integrated communicative process.
b) Foundation of knowledge. Ethnographic laboratory studies (Knorr-
Cetina 1981, 1999) open the perspective on knowledge processes,
which are fed by local, pragmatic tests and examinations. In the
context of legal procedure, knowledge is generated by way of eye
witnesses, expertise, or ‘‘outsourced’’ investigations (Valverde 2003;
Sarat et al. 2007). Contributions are documented, certified as facts,
and made available for future reference (Latour 2002). The review and
fixation of contributions can include the use of notes (Scheffer 2006),
protocols (Smith 1985), files (Vismann 2001; Scheffer 2007b), or
archives (Lynch 1999), depending on the scope of the inquiry. In this
way, the inquiry solidifies its own ‘‘case history’’ (Luhmann 1969,
p. 44) and keeps it available for future occasions. Speakers must
respond to the current standard of knowledge. In the case of public
inquiries, the additional element of an interested audience turns into
a knowledgeable and verifying authority. In this sense, the publicity of
knowledge processes reminds us of early modern scientific experi-
ments (Shapin and Schaffer 1985; Shapin 1994), the results of which
had to pass before an audience of ‘‘gentlemen’’. Knowledge processes
exhibit procedurality to the degree they rely on facts that have been
produced and processed internally. The question is whether the
inquiries proceed autonomously, i.e., from the facts they generate
themselves, or, conversely, whether they follow external postulates. In
the latter case, a necessary, but not sufficient condition of procedur-
ality would remain unfulfilled.
c) Decision-making ability. The concepts borrowed from the sociology
of organisations to analyse decision-making processes focus on
a ‘‘history of the decision’’ (Luhmann 1969, p. 40), i.e. a space of
possibilities that is sequentially narrowed down to a definitive and
final decision. Luhmann adds further sociological qualities to this
stepwise selection from pre-selections. The self-referential character
of the decision-making process immunises the procedure against
social differences of rank and status. The decision-makers judge cases
according to the participants’ ‘‘definitive’’ and ‘‘binding’’ statements
(Wolff and M€uller 1997). Participants are held to account for their
performances and representations. The contingent character of deci-
sions, paired with the internally-produced criteria for those decisions,
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motivates involvement and participation (Luhmann 1969, p. 114). A
decision observes behaviour as choice and thus as attributable (ibid.
p. 44). This formulates another necessary, but not sufficient, condition
for procedurality. We will speak of procedure if one binding decision
emerges at the end of an internal decision-making history. Conversely,
procedurality can be disputed if the decision is fixed per se or if it is
missing altogether.
The processes of communication, knowledge production and
decision-making prove to be more or less self-referential. Further-
more, they do not proceed separately, but refer to each other in the
course of the inquiries. How can we imagine their concurrence? Com-
munication, knowledge production and decision-making are mutually
structuring. Conversational interaction provides knowledge; protocols
keep this knowledge available to provide subsequent hearings with
new issues and questions; decision-making again utilises communica-
tion and knowledge in the form of criteria for judgement and
contrasts. These three processual perspectives also indicate in how
far the inquiries actually function as an integrated, self-referential,
and autonomous procedure. In the following, we attempt to show that
and how the inquiries succeed to detach and emancipate themselves
– more or less –1 from their environment as a procedure.
3. Methodical Maxims
The synopsis of processes of communication, knowledge produc-
tion and decision-making leads us to some methodical ground rules.
Firstly, we take a distanced and close-up look at political inquiries. We
take a distanced stance towards the exciting political debates and
investigations; on the other hand, we close in on the inquiries by
looking at their details in a partially microscopic analysis. Both these
movements can be formulated as the basic rules of our own procedure
(of data analysis): our conclusions grow from process data2, which are
produced and made available in the course of the inquiries. Analogous
to the minimal requirements for an ‘‘open’’ procedure, we do not
1 On some occasions, Luhmann also reform-
ulates the issue of procedural autonomy
– the temporal bracketing of controversial
issues, impartiality in factual matters, or
disregard to matters of status – in terms of
variables.




html (accessed October 2007). For the CIA
inquiry we quote from the English version of
the protocols.
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interpret the data from their results. Thus, the question of procedur-
ality only emerges after our empirical exploration. As a first step, we
are merely concerned to use the interrogations in the inquiries as
a starting point to determine how they operate with regard to
knowledge production and decision-making.
We will hone this stipulation by way of a contrastive method. The
following considerations provide the basis for our selection of cases:
a) at first glance, the inquiries are concerned with similar issues. They
both deal with matters of the ‘‘war against terror’’ and its legitimacy.
b) Both inquiries exhibit a considerable lack of procedural rules. This
factor propels the question about procedurality, i.e. the degree of auto-
nomy and integration exhibited by the communicative, knowledge-
producing and decision-making processes. c) Thus, both inquiries
become didactic pieces on the programming of these processes by
their operators. d) The inquiries already proved fundamentally dif-
ferent in the first data sightings. Thus, quick exchanges of questions
and answers in the Hutton Inquiry provide a stark contrast to the
markedly long speeches in the CIA committee.
Further analysis showed persistent differences in the progression,
methods, and approach of the respective inquiries. We integrated
these differences as features of political inquiries. We identified,
ordered and contrasted the respective peculiar elements according to
general criteria: inquiry methods, objects of inquiry, integration of the
inquiry, impositions and their limits. In this way, we actively produced
comparability between our cases (Niew€ohner and Scheffer 2008).
This results in a typification of strong and weak procedure. The
confrontation of the cases served to focus some single characteristics:
the questions ‘‘How is this there? How is this here?’’ stimulated
empirical-analytical ‘‘explication’’ (Hirschauer 2001). Contrasting the
political inquiries serves not only to thicken and explicate; at the same
time, it stimulates the ‘‘sociological imagination’’ (Mills 1959), i.e., it
served to imagine a certain scope of variation. The contrasts invite us
to apply the procedural analysis to further cases (e.g., the German
‘‘Visa’’ committee) and to extend the bases of comparison by adding
further facets (e.g., the role of the political public, which is only
sketched here). Finally, the contrasts are to be merged and interpreted
according to the three criteria of procedurality.
A further methodical ground rule relates to the empirical use of
theoretical concepts. We are concerned with using the contrasts in
order to operationalise the notion of procedure as a matter of varying
magnitudes, or a sum of variables. With respect to our contrasting
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cases, this does not culminate in a distinction between procedure and
non-procedure, but rather in a relativisation of procedurality. ‘‘Strong
procedure’’ and ‘‘weak procedure’’ do not denote ideal types, but
rather points in an empirical spectrum. In this way, our analysis also
serves as an example of how very fine-grained methodological
approaches can contribute to the specification of grand theoretical
blueprints. Thus, the empirical variation highlighted by the contrasts
strongly invites further empirical work leading to a sociological
explication of the notion of procedure.
4. The cases: Hutton Inquiry and CIA Committee
The Hutton Inquiry was constituted only days after the weapons
expert and former UN inspector in Iraq, Dr David Kelly, was found
dead near his home. The inquiry was set up on the intiative of Prime
Minister Tony Blair in July 2003 at a time of heated debate: anti-war
demonstrations were spreading, individual ministers were protesting
and resigning, and there was open dissent between EU member states.
Immediately before his death, David Kelly was at the centre of
a controversy between the Government and the BBC about a dossier
on the threat of Iraqi ‘‘weapons of mass destruction’’. On 29 May
2003, BBC journalist Andrew Gilligan quoted an ‘‘unnamed source’’,
who had claimed that the dossier was changed against the wishes of
the intelligence services shortly before its publication. The allegation
was that the ‘‘sexed up’’ version of the dossier was meant to legitimise
Britain’s decision to go to war vis-à-vis a critical public. The
Government denied this. In June 2003, the parliamentary Foreign
Affairs Select Committee (FAC) concerned itself with ‘‘The Decision
to go to War in Iraq’’. In the course of this inquiry, clues emerged that
Dr Kelly may have been Gilligan’s ‘‘anonymous source’’. On 18 July,
the day after the Ministry of Defence confirmed Dr Kelly was the
likely source, he was found dead.
The Prime Minister immediately announced an independent in-
quiry. The Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs commissioned
the High Court judge Lord Hutton to preside over the inquiry. A
‘‘Letter of Appointment’’, dated 24 July 2003, defined the terms of the
inquiry: ‘‘Urgently to conduct an investigation into the circumstances
surrounding the death of Dr David Kelly’’. In principle, British
ministers can establish political inquiries without prior debate or
division in Parliament (Ziemske 1991). Such an extra-parliamentary
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inquiry does not have judicial powers to summon or swear in
witnesses.3 At the beginning of his inquiry on 1 August 2003, Lord
Hutton announced a number of self-imposed procedural standards.
He announced a two-stage progression: a first phase ‘‘will be devoted
to obtaining, in a neutral way, by counsel to the Inquiry, an account of
the events which took place by those who took part in them’’; a second
phase is concerned only with ‘‘persons whom I have notified of
possible criticisms’’. The latter are recalled and cross-examined by
counsel for the various parties (BBC, Government, Kelly family)
(Hearing transcript Ht., 01/08/03, 21-22).
The inquiry encountered extensive media interest. In Luhmann’s
terminology: as a public issue, it was a ‘‘breakthrough’’ (1971, p.18),
i.e. it quickly became ‘‘part of public opinion in the sense of our
concept; it appears in daily press reporting in a way which presup-
poses that everybody knows the history of the issue’’ (ibid.; translation
JS). In the course of the inquiry, the press quoted extensively from the
protocols, constructed preliminary scores, and speculated about
possible outcomes. A surge of critical voices about the inquiry can
only be found on the day after Lord Hutton published his final report.
Criticism focused on fixation on detail and political blindness:
Lord Hutton failed to put this row into its full context, or to recognise that
Mr Gilligan had touched, albeit inaccurately, on a real issue. [. . .] That issue,
essentially whether Mr Blair was justified in committing Britain to war, remains.
[. . .] Lord Hutton could not, and did not, deal with these questions. But doubts
over the justification for war will remain long after Hutton will be forgotten
(The Times, 29/01/04, 19).
We compare the Hutton Inquiry to the ‘‘Temporary Committee on
the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transport
and illegal detention of prisoners’’ (TDIP). It was set up by the
European Parliament (EP) as a ‘‘temporary committee’’ according to
Article 175 of the EP’s rules of procedure on 18 January 2006
(P6_TA-Prov(2006)0012). Parliament was unable to agree on the
competence of regular committees of inquiry (Kipke 1989; Shackleton
1998; Dreischer 2004) – as, for example, in the case of an ‘‘alleged
violation of community law’’. The terms of reference defined tasks
(‘‘to collect and analyse information to find out whether the CIA’’),
the general course of action (‘‘will liaise and cooperate as closely as
3 This was the legal situation until 2005
(cf. Tribunals of Inquiry [Evidence] Act
1921). According to the new Inquiries Act,
ministers can also commission inquiries with
corresponding judicial powers. Parliament
must merely be ‘‘informed’’ about the com-
position, chairperson(s), and terms of the
inquiry.
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possible with the Council of Europe’’), time frame (four months plus
a possible extension) and composition (‘‘46 members of the European
Parliament’’) of the inquiry. By comparison, the EP’s rules of pro-
cedure (II, Ch. 2, Art 42-48) specify the proceedings and operation of
inquiries only generally. Implementation is left to the committees
themselves. The CIA Committee discussed its proceedings and mode
of operation at its second meeting on 13 February 2006.4 It agreed on
‘‘general principles’’ (Working document n1, 14/02/06). The work
programme contains a ‘‘provisional calendar of meetings’’ until the
first preliminary report, as well as suggestions for invitations (a list of
persons and institutions), delegations and special reports.
The appointment of the inquiry was preceded by various judicial
inquiries in member states and by unsuccessful queries to the
European Commission and the Council of Europe (E-2203/05 and
E-2204/05). After the Washington Post published an ‘‘investigative
report’’ on 2 November 2005 and the Council of Europe initiated an
investigation, the EP applied for the appointment of a special com-
mittee. This committee began its work on 26 January 2006, without
much press coverage. Ten months later, the committee published
a final report, which focused, next to a political assessment of the
results, on the work accomplished and on assessing its cooperation
with various governments, international institutions and organisa-
tions.5 The EP agreed on the committee report with slight changes in
wording on 14 February 2007 (P6_TA-PROV (2007)0032).
As determined in its first work programme, the committee did not
only conduct hearings, but also sent delegations and analysed flight
and satellite data. The committee cooperated with further public
institutions (e.g. the Council of Europe) and with journalists called as
more or less knowledgeable informants. The running press reporting
was limited to a few highlights: the constituent meeting, the interim
reports, important witnesses’ testimonies, and the final report. Public
debate would not spark. As a ‘‘public issue’’ (Luhmann 1971, p. 18),
the inquiry (unlike its object: the CIA flights) remained in its ‘‘latent
phase’’ (ibid.).
Press observers, like some committee members, doubted the
relevance and probative force of the running investigations. The final
report, published on 28 November 2006, on the other hand, was
showered with praise: the press wrote about a ‘‘new confirmation’’
4 Cf. Press Release, 14/02/06: MEPs out-
line plans to probe CIA flights and detention
centres, EP Press Service, first paragraph.
5 Specific insights were summarised in
working documents (n 7 and 8), which are
referred to in the report.
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(The New York Times, 29/11/06) and ‘‘serious circumstantial evi-
dence’’ (Washington Post, 29/11/06). Some commentators called for ‘‘a
forceful EU response’’ (The Times, 29/11/06) or ‘‘continued inves-
tigations’’ (Taz, 24/01/07, own translation). According to The In-
dependent (29/11/06), however, the inquiry showed ‘‘little new’’.
In the following, we turn to the goings-on in the committees. We
probe and contrast the inquiries’ unique characteristics with reference
to shared problems: How do they process their terms of reference?
How do the inquiries produce knowledge? How do they reach
decisions? We relate our contrasting empirical answers to the problem
of (kind and intensity) of procedurality. In the conclusion, we will at
once strengthen and weaken the contrast of strong and weak procedure
through the notion of interplay. It can be shown that participants, as
well as audiences and sponsors, do at times invoke the respective other
procedural register – and thus pit formal requirements against each
other.
II. How do committees of inquiry proceed?
The Hutton Inquiry and the CIA Committee seem to fulfil analo-
gous functions, which in turn seem to correspond to descriptions of their
tasks from political science: revealing ‘‘misconduct’’; re-establishing
‘‘public trust’’; calming ‘‘scandals’’. The inquiries’ respective legal
designs also display some similarities: both are temporary institutions
with special competence and without major case-spanning structures or
effective means of coercion. Conversely, a look at the actual hearings
reveals fundamental differences.
1. Lists of questions and series of questions: strong and weak modes of
questioning
Question: How do committees of inquiry investigate?
Answer: by way of questions. While the EU-committee works off
lists of questions, the Hutton Inquiry displays dynamic question/
answer exchanges. The following excerpt is from the interrogation of
journalist Andrew Gilligan on the second day of the inquiry. Queens
Counsel (QC) James Dingemans, counsel for the inquiry, is question-
ing Gilligan on the notes he produced after his informal interviews
with his informant, the weapons inspector Kelly:
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1 Q. You wanted to read into that your questions. Was there any
question that provoked the first note on BBC/7/57?
A. Yes. We started by talking about other things and then we got on
to the dossier; and I said: What happened to it? When we last met
5 you were saying it was not very exciting. He said: Yes, that is right,
until the last week it was just as I told you. It was transformed in
the week before publication. I said: To make it sexier? And he said:
Yes, to make it sexier. [. . .]
[6 lines omitted]
10 Q. Then there is the entry that is just a single word, ‘‘Campbell’’.
Was there any question that gave rise to that entry?
A. Yes, it was something like: how did this transformation happen?
Q. Right.
A. And then the answer was that, one word.
15 Q. And he just said ‘‘Campbell’’?
A. Yes.
Q. And what question led to the next entry?
A. Well I was surprised and I said: What, you know, Campbell made
it up? They made it up? And he said: No, it was real information but
20 it was unreliable and it was included against our wishes.
Lord Hutton: May I just ask you, Mr Gilligan, looking at the first
paragraph, you put the question: Was it to make it sexier? And Dr
Kelly replied: Yes, to make it sexier?
A. Yes, to make it sexier, yes, so he adopted my words.
25 Lord Hutton: Now are you clear in your recollection that you
asked how was it transformed, and that the name Campbell was
first spoken by Dr Kelly?
A. Yes, absolutely.
Lord Hutton: It was not a question by you: Was Campbell
30 involved in this?
A. No, it was him. He raised the subject of the 45 minutes and he
raised the subject of Campbell.
(Ht, 12/08/03, 25-27)
Formally, the following course of interaction can be identified: a request
(1-2) elicits a short narration (3-8). After a short digression, the QC invites
Gilligan to continue his reconstruction of the course of the interview (10-
11). The respondent then expands on his previous answer and the
interrogator specifies the response (14-15). This is followed by another
invitation to continue the narration (17), before the chair intervenes and has
Gilligan confirm his answer to the initial question by repeating it (21-23).
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Lord Hutton’s ‘‘May I just ask you’’ (21) suggests to the witness
that this issue was of relatively minor importance. The respondent
takes up his own repeated answer and delivers a ‘‘telltale’’ reform-
ulation (‘‘He adopted my words’’, 24). Lord Hutton now has the
answer to the second request confirmed (25-27). The next enquiry
suggests expanding Gilligan’s ‘‘admission’’ in response to the pre-
vious suggestive question to further parts of the interview (29-30).6
This sets up the conclusion: If Andrew Gilligan suggested a specific
formulation to his informant once, why not a second or third time?
The CIA Committee does not display those ‘‘exciting’’ question/
answer-dynamics. This kind of dynamic is unlikely because questions
are commonly asked in rounds. In such a round of questions, every
committee member has the opportunity to ask (a block of) questions in
their allotted time. On the chair’s initiative, questions can also be
collected.
We can observe the effect of this organisation in the following
example. A member is questioning Mrs Mariner, the representative of
the organisation Human Rights Watch:
First of all, you said that it is the task of this committee to find out what the
governments have known about things that may or may not have been going on.
It would be very useful if you could help us ask the right questions. That brings
me to the issue of the definition of torture [. . .]. If we ask whether these
renditions or extraordinary renditions have led to people being taken to
countries where they were tortured, is that not the wrong question? If the
United States or the CIA uses a different definition of torture, then they are
obviously going to say ‘‘no’’. Perhaps we should rephrase the questions.
Secondly, regarding Romania, there is a report by a Romanian NGO, OADO,
which says that no evidence was found of the existence of any prison camps or
prisons on Romanian soil. I would like to hear your opinion on that report.
Thirdly, and this is a more general question, what is the role of the US Congress
in all this? Do you have regular contacts there and how do they see this matter?
(VR, 23/02/06, 11).
The questioning results in heterogeneous blocks of questions,
which the respondent then works off. The collection of questions
does not aim to evoke discrepancies by repetition or to dramatise by
‘‘zooming in’’ on details. Questions like ‘‘Can you tell us something
6 Here, we see the combination of what
Holly (1981) calls ‘‘hard and soft strategies’’
in interrogations. Some soft strategies are:
seemingly harmless questions, the full weight
of which will only be obvious later, distrac-
tions and repetition of single statements.
Hard strategies are: marking discrepancies,
confronting answers with investigative re-
sults or other witnesses’ discrepant answers,
or demanding opinions.
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more about those facilities [offshore prisons]? We are they or were
they and what proof, evidence or clues are there as to their existence?’’
(VR, 21/03/06, 5) seek to elicit further information.
Next to their lists of questions, members also deliver assessments
and evaluations on the factual situation:
You keep talking about sources, about facts, about a plane which went to key
destinations linked to terrorism. While I grant that many of the things you say
may be true, and that the Americans most probably did not behave in the way
we would expect them to, I just want to ask you if you yourself are really
convinced by all the things you found out or do you, like me, still have some
small doubts as to the credibility and veracity of the things we are talking about.
Do you think it is all true or do you still have some doubts about the facts? (VR,
21/03/06, 6).
Confronted with a variety of questions and evaluations, respond-
ents have a wide margin to structure their answers according to their
own requirements. In this, they are not required to follow a certain
order or even to respond to every question. Omissions, sometimes
with reference to time constraints, are the rule. Some questions
remain unanswered.
The committee receives answers that connect facts, indications, and
assumptions. At the same time, the respondents position themselves
politically and with regard to the contents of the question. Thus,
journalist Stephen Grey attempts to use, e.g., reservations (‘‘we do not
know’’, ‘‘my understanding is’’) and extensions (speculation and
generalisation: ‘‘it knew’’), as well as external evidence, to match his
information to the question at hand:
There are still question marks as regards the involvement of British intelligence.
We do not know the extent of complicity of European Governments [. . .] in these
practices or how much they knew [. . .]. My understanding is that the British
Government has been opposed to the practice of rendition although it has been
aware of it. It was aware of these activities but tried to keep a distance from
them. [. . .] One could quote the former Foreign Affairs Minister, Chris Mullin,
who raised suspicions that the British Government was involved in providing
information to the Americans (VR, 21.03.06, 7 emphases added).
The journalist’s talk encompasses facts, indirect knowledge, suspi-
cions and nescience. This variance is not the only contrast to the
Hutton Inquiry. The CIA Committee further allows for respondents
to assist in specifying problems and questions. Respondents them-
selves ask questions, plead for information, or formulate accusations.
This provides a first impression of how ‘‘asking questions’’ is done
in the respective inquiries. Accordingly, the EU Committee conducts
it hearings as negotiations between relatively co-equal colleagues.
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Respondents experience relatively large degrees of freedom to shape
their own contributions. In the Hutton Inquiry, on the other hand, the
logic of interrogation with decisive default answers dominates the
questioning. Those different modes of participation relate closely to
the question of how the individual hearings are integrated into the
overall inquiry and how the former work to integrate the latter by way
of prospective and retrospective connections.
2. Statements or issues: on the operation of memory and internal connections
The hearings involve different forms of remembering and con-
necting. Besides hearing protocols, the EU-committee also produces
interim statements and ‘‘working documents’’ containing topical and
situational reports. The protocols do not feed back into the hearings.
They do not serve to ‘‘pin down’’ respondents. Inconsistencies (e.g.,
incorrect quotes or contradictory dates) are neither registered nor
addressed. The rapporteur complains about the committee members
‘‘forgetfulness’’: ‘‘It seems almost as if each hearing is our first’’ (VR,
21/03/06,16). However, this way of utilising documents does not only
imply forgetfulness, but also a specific way to remember.
In the EU-committee, memory is not focused on statements but
rather on issues. It provides issue-oriented connections within a het-
erogeneous field of indications. Connections are not only made to
issues that arise in the committee itself. E.g., a committee member
asks Mrs Mariner for ulterior investigative results: ‘‘I wonder whether
you have reached a different conclusion from that drawn by the
investigations carried out in Sweden and whether you are familiar
with their contents’’ (VR, 23/02/06, 9).
These issue-oriented connections do not impose a binding force on
respondents; they do not confront the latter with telltale inconsisten-
cies. Instead, the connections serve to establish indications or leads,
which are then followed further. We can observe this relation to
procedural history in the way that members mark ‘‘wrong answers’’.
Rather than representing contradictions, ‘‘wrong answers’’ are marked
generally ex ante:
Finally, you said that the governments of these two countries [Poland and
Romania] provided the CIA with exclusive use of sites. What sites were these? I
would ask you to stick to the facts, since, if the site in question is the airport at
Szymany in Poland, it is widely known that this is a civil facility which can be
used by anyone who so desires and there was nothing exclusive about its use
(VR, 23/02/06, 6).
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In this line, the rare instances when witnesses are recalled do not
serve to test earlier answers, but rather to collect further information
and to provide updates on relevant issue areas. The prosecutor
Spataro formulates this in his second appearance:
I think it would be useful for you – this is what I have grasped from the
summons to this meeting – to be brought up to date on the most recent
developments in the investigation subsequent to what you learnt in the last
hearing, approximately seven months ago (VR, 09/10/06, 1).
The British inquiry also establishes connections and continuities
across several hearings, in line with one of our criteria for procedur-
ality. However, in the Hutton Inquiry, memory is not structured
topically. Here, connections are made between statements rather than
between issues. The Hutton Inquiry interlocks speakers and utter-
ances; it proceeds by way of authorised and attributable statements.
This is precisely the purpose of the verbatim protocols, produced by
stenographers during the hearings. The protocols serve as the
authoritative medium to fix utterances as statements ‘‘en detail’’ and
to keep those statements available for further hearings (Antaki and
Leudar 2001).
In the Hutton Inquiry, repeated questioning makes connections to
earlier statements possible. Witnesses are confronted with statements
from the first round of hearings. The inquiry culminates in cross-
examinations, in which witnesses have to relate to ‘‘their own statements’’.
See this extract from the Government lawyer’s cross-examination of
Gilligan:
Mr Sumption: On the last occasion that you gave evidence to this inquiry,
Mr Gilligan, when you were asked what you had said to Ms Wilson, you replied –
the question was: ‘‘Question: In the early morning broadcast you have referred
to the Government knowing that the 45 minute claim was wrong before it was
put in. Did you put that allegation to the Ministry of Defence press officer?’’
Your answer was: ‘‘I do not believe I did put those specific words, no. As I say, I
cannot remember exactly what I said. I gave them an outline of the story but I
cannot remember exactly what I said to them.’’ When you gave evidence to
Ms Rogers this morning you produced a complete string of precise statements
about what you had said. What has happened since that last occasion to wake up
your memory on this point? (Ht, 17/09/03, 55).
Connections to earlier answers emphasise the Hutton Inquiry’s
self-reference. The inquiry itself produces – in public – the facts and
contrasts meant to substantiate and legitimise the final judgement. At
the same time, the close retrospective connection to statements marks
sharp boundaries to external ‘‘hearsay’’ and ‘‘speculations’’. Only
what emerges from the inquiry itself counts as evidence. By contrast,
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the issue-oriented structuring of the EU Committee aims at explora-
tion. It is open to more or less vague and indirect indications to
a complex set of issues. It collects and sifts findings from a conglom-
erate of inquiries.
3. Culminations and extensions: what ‘‘drives’’ the inquiries
In the questioning of Gilligan, the interrogator attempts to
entangle the witness in his own statements by use of ‘‘cunning
questions’’. This style of questioning relies on the verbatim protocols
of earlier hearings. These provide the basis to reveal inconsistencies,
or, alternatively, to strengthen a favoured version. The following
interrogation by the Inquiry QC, Mr Dingemans, deals with the
newspaper article in which Gilligan directly accused Alastair Camp-
bell, the Prime Minister’s director of communications and strategy,
for the ‘‘transformation of the dossier’’:
1 Q. Did you have any contact after your Today broadcast with
Dr Kelly before you wrote this article?
A. No, I did not. I tried to speak to him but had not been able to
get through, although not specifically to talk about this but to see
5 how the thing had gone down, the broadcast.
Lord Hutton You say you had not got through. Did you try his
home number?
A. Yes.
Lord Hutton And what, there was no reply?
10 A. There was an answer machine.
Lord Hutton Did you also try his mobile?
A. I cannot remember if I tried his mobile or not, I am afraid. I
may have done.
Mr. Dingemans When did you do this?
15 A. I am not precisely sure when, but not very long after the
broadcast.
[5 lines omitted]
Q. Did you make any other attempt to contact Dr Kelly before his
death?
20 A. No. I mean, in the later stages I very badly wanted to speak to
him; but I knew – you see, after the furore blew up I knew that the
risk might be that I would compromise him by trying to phone him.
In fact, I did try to phone him once from a phone box and again
I just got the answerphone and I did not leave a message again.
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25 Q. So your evidence is that you did try to contact him?
A. Yes, I did try to contact him twice. The – as I say, once before
the main sort of fuss about my story blew up and then once after.
[8 lines omitted]
Q. But you have already mentioned phoning from a public phone
30 box, you tried that once. Did you try it again?
A. No, I only tried it the once.
Q. And why, if, as you say, you were keen to talk to him, did you
not try again?
A. Because I was worried that any attempt to contact him might
35 be – you know, might compromise him.
(12/08/03, 116-118).
Instead of focussing on the content of the article, the questions
concern Gilligan’s contacts with his informant. The enquiries are
concerned to establish what became of Gilligan’s call to Kelly (9); when
exactly he called (14); which numbers he dialled (6,11); and whether he
had tried again (32-33). The questions investigate more and more details.
Incidentally, they render ‘‘vague’’ answers more precise (e.g. 10/11). The
facts of the matter in question become increasingly detailed, and their
pertinence is hardly discernible for observers and witnesses alike. The
following confrontation finally reveals the full force of the questions.
Accordingly, the ‘‘inscrutable’’ questions circle around an inconsis-
tency between Gilligan’s current testimony and his own previous
comments to the FAC. The QC quotes extensively from the latter:
Q. Can I take you, in that respect, to part of the evidence you gave to
the Foreign Affairs Committee? It is FAC/3/35. This was the second
time you gave evidence. [. . .] Can I just take you to the middle answer:
40 ‘‘Let me just make this absolutely clear. The source did not say either
that Mr Campbell did not insert or that he did insert it, I have never
claimed otherwise. The claim was that the 45 minute claim was
inserted ‘against our wishes’, against the wishes of the source, and that
the claim had been transformed in the week before it waspublished at
45 the behest of Alastair Campbell (I imagine you meant the dossier
rather than the claim there). That is entirely consistent with
everything I have said, it is entirely consistent. There is no difference
between what I said to you before and what I have said now.
It has been interpreted in the media to say that we reported that
50 Mr Campbell inserted the 45 minute claim, that may be the case but
we reported it neither way. We said, or the source said, that the
transformation had occurred in the week before it was published at the
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behest of Alastair Campbell. That is the claim we have always made
and that is the claim that the source has always made and that is the
55 claim the source continues to make.’’ Had you contacted Dr Kelly?
A. No, and I think that was a mistake saying ‘‘continues’’. I mean,
it was a – the atmosphere at that session was extremely fraught and
I – you know, I – I was not – it was not the best performance I have
ever given in front of a committee.
60 (12/08/03, 118-120).
‘‘And why, if, as you say, you were keen to talk to him, did you not try
again?’’ (32-33). This culmination establishes one side of the inconsis-
tency; the flip side is provided by an earlier statement introduced from
a previous inquiry. This results in a contrast which seems to take Gilligan
(as well as the ‘‘casual’’ observer) by surprise: the statement ‘‘That is the
claim the source continues to make’’ (54-55) presupposes further contact
between the reporter and his informant. However, Gilligan has denied
such further contacts until this point. Gilligan finds himself in
a quandary: he is forced to correct at least one of his earlier statements.
The Hutton inquiry culminates in questions of credibility and
responsibility. The unfolding communication climaxes in knowledge
tests that gain decisive character. At the same time, the decisions
connect to witnesses’ ‘‘free’’ representations, i.e. those for which the
individual witness is responsible. This strength in bringing seemingly
irrelevant details to the fore, however, also entails a highly visible
liability: the inquiry risks getting lost in details.7
Involving witnesses by culminating in details is directly opposed to
the operation of the EU Committee, which expands and diversifies its
issue-oriented investigation. Rather than inducing respondents to
repeat their statements and contrasting those statements, the com-
mittee sifts new information and attaches new leads to these. The
leads are meant to specify ‘‘nebulous speculations’’ and transform
them into justified suspicions. By ‘‘collect[ing] and analys[ing] in-
formation’’ (terms of reference), the committee investigates
‘‘whether’’ specific legal infractions happened. The collected indica-
tions are combined to provide scenarios. The goal is to establish an
overall picture which can instruct further, more precisely directed
inquiries. The rapporteur, Claudio Fava, provides an exemplary
expression of this ‘‘drive’’ in his question to Khaled al-Masri:
7 Thus, Twining sees a systematic con-
nection between a procedure’s attention to
detail and its focus: ‘‘A quasi-judicial pro-
cedure can produce extraordinary detail and
openness, but at the almost inevitable cost of
narrowing the issues’’ (2004, p.38).
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First of all I should like to ask a few questions – brief but quite numerous –
because, as you will have realised, what we need to do is try and collect a good
many details, facts and hard evidence about your experiences and your story
(VR, 13/03/06, 7).
These ‘‘what else’’ type of questions indicate the procedural ‘‘drive’’:
what else happened, when, where, etc. The investigation does not bracket
hearsay or speculation, but mobilises these. In this line, a ‘‘victim’’,
Mr Kurnaz, is also asked for ‘‘second-hand knowledge’’:
Do you remember anything that you ever heard from any other detainee,
directly or indirectly – this is not a court so it can be just an indirect comment –
regarding the detention of someone in Europe before the transfer to Guantá-
namo? In this case I would not only be talking about transport, but positively
the detention anywhere in Europe before the transfer to Guantánamo (VR, 22/
11/06, 5).
Indications can ground further research. The corresponding re-
quest ‘‘It would be very useful if you could help us ask the right
questions’’ (VR, 23/02/06, 11) would indeed never be asked in the
Hutton Inquiry. The CIA inquiry performs extensive searches. It
does not falsify the submissions made by ‘‘guests’’. The openness of
the inquiry makes it difficult to integrate diverse epistemic standards,
to establish stable and sustainable selections, and thus to provide for
a systematic conclusion. Rather than concluding by ‘‘answering the
question’’ posed by the terms of reference, the inquiry simply
concludes within the time frame set by parliament.
4. Actions and conditions: the objects of inquiry
Differences with regard to the integration, self-reference and
delineation of the two procedures do not only correspond to different
methods of inquiry, but also to different objects. The EU Committee
asks whether something possibly happened. To formulate the problem
in this way, a general initial suspicion is sufficient. The suspicion is fed
by ‘‘superficial knowledge’’ – hearsay, individual fates and fortunes,
indications, etc. The reverse of this superficial knowledge is not to be
seen in (false) statements that can be attributed, as in the Hutton
Inquiry, but rather in nescience with all its side effects, such as mere
suspicion and secretiveness. Appearing before the Committee, the
European Council’s investigator, Dick Marty, qualifies the object and
knowledge of the inquiry as follows:
I repeat and confirm that all of these facts do not constitute overwhelming proof,
but they are sufficiently disturbing as to warrant an investigation and a response
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from European civil society in the absence of a clear response from European
governments (VR, 23/02/06, 47).
In order to initiate an inquiry, parliament must first recongise a deficit
in information (Kipke 1989; H€opfner 2004), which cannot be remedied
by queries to other public bodies. As a consequence, committee
members are often left in the dark. They speculate on an object that
is still gaining shape. Thus, Dick Marty responds to a member’s
question ‘‘From your vantage point, where do you see things which
we as a committee should be doing here?’’ with the comment: ‘‘It seems
to me that you have already received certain pieces of information today
which could be reasons to put a whole series of questions to representa-
tives of particular countries’’ (VR, 23/02/06, 49).
The ‘‘incidents’’ the inquiry addresses operate as indications for
‘‘deficiencies’’. Instead of (attributed) actions, the inquiry is con-
cerned with (deplorable) circumstances. The investigations aim to
define and illuminate these circumstances and to evaluate them
politically. Such an inquiry is rather far removed from determining
facts. The CIA Committee aims at general clarification, political and
moral judgement, and preparing general recommendations (EP Rules
of Procedure, Art. 175 f., App. VIII). The rapporteur expresses these
aims: ‘‘It is our job to evaluate the data we have gathered [. . .] and to
form our political opinion on that basis’’ (VR, 21/03/06, 16).
The questions in the Hutton Inquiry investigate the ‘‘circum-
stances surrounding the death of Dr David Kelly’’. It is to be
established who is (generally and to what extent) responsible for his
death. The inquiry assumes and reconstructs causality. Actions have
an immediate or indirect effect on subsequent events. The inquiry is
tasked to attribute occurrences as actions and actions as causes. On
this dimension, the Hutton Inquiry can be likened to investigations in
a penal court. Testimony is taken from eye witnesses of the events in
question. Statements – e.g., ‘‘I was slightly after, you know maybe 10
or 15 minutes late. He was waiting when I got there.’’ (Ht, 12/08/03,
16) – do position a witness relative to the event in question. The
witness expresses that there was indeed a meeting on which he can
provide inside information. Additionally, beyond witnessing, actual
participation is evaluated according to norms such as reasonableness
and accuracy (see final report, p. 3). In this way, the inquiry constructs
and evaluates the past as a chain of actions and consequences of actions.
The following questions (Ht, 12/08/03) establish a chain of actions in
Gilligan’s work as a reporter:
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Does that support the reporting that you have set out at page 4? (p. 72, l. 21-22).
And if it is not entirely supported by what Dr Kelly had said [. . .], why did you
not go back and check it with him? (p. 73, l. 4-7).
Was this allegation ever withdrawn at any time before Dr Kelly died? (p. 73,
l. 13-14)
These questions do more than inter-link actions; they also serve to
evaluate those actions in light of the established links. They establish
a connection between Gilligan’s ‘‘careless’’ reporting and the ‘‘un-
necessary’’ escalation of the conflict:
The lawyers have a distinction between mistakes and fraud, and this was
effectively a charge of fraud, was it not? (p. 73, l. 25 - p. 74, l. 1).
This story was picked up and reported worldwide. [. . .] What was picked up and
reported worldwide in some of the reports was the allegation of express bad
faith, was it not? (p. 74, l. 14-17).
The questions assemble actions like chain links. This produces
a causal chain, starting with Gilligan’s interview with Kelly and
ending in Kelly’s act of desperation. The conclusion attributes
a partial liability for Kelly’s death to Gilligan, due to his ‘‘misinter-
pretations’’, his ‘‘hasty reporting’’, and his ‘‘failure to issue a correc-
tion’’. The conclusion suggests: Had Gilligan (among others) acted
differently, Dr Kelly would possibly still be alive. This substantive
reasoning on personal guilt provides a sharp contrast to the broad
strokes used to draw a picture of ‘‘alarming’’ or ‘‘deplorable’’
conditions in the CIA Committee.
5. Informants and eye witnesses: the epistemic subjects
Committees of inquiry investigate antecedent conditions or occur-
rences by way of interrogation. The selection of witnesses varies,
depending on the object of the inquiry. Thus, in order to close a chain
of actions, including possible attributions of responsibility, the Hutton
Inquiry mobilises eye witnesses, i.e., mainly persons who observed
incidents immediately. Expert witnesses, who provide classification
and evaluation of these observations, are of secondary relevance. The
category of eye witnesses becomes double-edged when statements feed
into hardly-straightforward truth tests and moral assessments.
Lord Hutton’s witness list grows out of a hypothetical chronology
of the events leading up to Dr Kelly’s death. This chronology provides
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a basis for the order by which witnesses are called in.8 It provides clues
as to the pertinence of individual witnesses. The eye witnesses selected
by Lord Hutton can be arranged in concentric circles in relation to
Kelly’s last actions as a weapons expert (not as a private person): the
innermost circle includes those who had contact with Kelly shortly
before his death (e.g., Gilligan or Kelly’s immediate superiors). The
next, wider circle contains persons who are expected to give information
on political decisions ‘‘in the Kelly affair’’ (e.g., government ministers or
advisers). The outer circles are constituted by witnesses (e.g., his widow
or a psychiatrist) who have only indirect knowledge of his professional
activities and can give information on his behaviour, the state of his
health, or his personal plans and ambitions.
A close ‘‘causal’’ proximity to the weapons expert Kelly also
implies a high potential for a witness to be deemed responsible for
the investigated ‘‘circumstances’’. With its logic of causal and moral
attribution, the inquiry procedure anticipates that witnesses might
attempt to hide or downplay their responsibility. Thus, the inves-
tigators’ task is to elicit information on the witnesses’ own involve-
ment. The approach used in the Hutton Inquiry resembles the testing
of hypotheses. In the course of the inquiry, the preliminary chronol-
ogy – including its causal assumptions – is tested and/or modified.
By contrast, the CIA Committee relies on cooperation. It invites
‘‘Guests’’ (cf. work programme, protocols) for ‘‘discussion’’ or an
‘‘exchange of views’’. The ‘‘guests’’ are often interested in clarification
on their own part; they want to contribute and to bring their own
interests to bear on the investigations. Thus, the following question to
the European Council’s rapporteur, Mr Marty, is symptomatic:
Therefore, quite specifically: from your vantage point, where do you see things
which we as a committee should be doing here? Where can we help you and vice
versa? Do you have any practical suggestions as to which experts we could invite
and question, which would then assist both your work and ours? (VR, 23/02/06,
49).
The committee expects ‘‘guests’’ to help in reconstructing a general
perspective. They appear as informants, similar to natives in relation
to ‘‘their culture’’. The hearings operate as discussions, exchanging
and synchronising both factual knowledge and assessments. In this
logic, ‘‘victims’’ are also asked for ‘‘second-hand’’ assessments and
information beyond their own immediate experiences. Their contri-
bution to clarification is crucial to the inquiry; personal involvement is
8 See the ‘‘opening statement’’ of 01/08/03, 15-16.
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rather distracting. The informants are not chosen according to their
proximity to some act, but rather according to possible insights in
possible occurrences. The ‘‘work programme’’ lists a selection of
informants and assigns those to general categories (‘‘representatives of
institutions’’, ‘‘journalists’’, ‘‘witnesses’’, ‘‘victims’’, etc.). This list is
completed in the course of the hearings. The incomplete and vague
‘‘guest list’’ corresponds to a certain lack of previous knowledge.
The chair introduces each guest to the committee. The protocol
notes each guest’s name and function. At the beginning of the hearing,
the chair assigns general competencies. Thus, e.g., Mr Kurnaz is also
questioned as ‘‘a witness of what was going on in Guantánamo’’
(VR, 22/11/06, 5), while the journalist Grey appears as an expert:
‘‘He [Mr al-Masri] also said he had passed this information on to the
press, so I imagine that you too know about it, as a specialist in the
matter. My question is: what do you think of his version of events?’’
(VR, 21/03/06, 12). The invitation is based on an ascribed inside or
expert knowledge, which in turn frames and stimulates the questioning.
The relatively relaxed setting in the committee allows guests (here, e.g.
the journalist Grey) to position themselves by way of evasive (‘‘I do not
want to respond to’’), qualifying (‘‘I want to try’’), or definitive (‘‘I am
in no doubt’’) statements:
I do not want to respond to your comments because it is up to you to make the
politics. I only want to try and help with what you want me to help with, which is
to present the facts and what I know. [. . .] I am not here to criticise what the
Americans are doing. [. . .] However, I am in no doubt that this sort of treatment
does occur [. . .]. I know that because the people [. . .] told me so (VR, 21/03/06,
6-7, emphases added).
Sometimes, ascribed knowledge and actual answers diverge. Guests
tend to disappoint expectations or to justify their invitation. In the EP’s
CIA committee, there is a tacit, general imperative for cooperation.
Appeals are made to conscience, integrity, and character. Answers
‘‘provoke’’ moral reprobation if and when they ‘‘cover up’’ or ‘‘conceal’’.
In contrast to the Hutton Inquiry, reprobation does not establish
personal but rather political responsibility, which is ‘‘attached’’ to states,
institutions, or interest groups.
6. Impositions and rejections
Both inquiries establish particular procedural roles (witnesses and
guests) with their respective limited degrees of freedom. These roles
impose ‘‘presumed participant or member knowledge’’ (Scheffer
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2002) and a demand for cooperation. Thus, the EU Committee
oftentimes does more than ask for information, demanding additional
assessments and judgements. The demand to have an opinion can be
experienced as imposing, particularly if it is to be announced in public.
In this perspective, Grey’s refusal in the previous example appears as
marking an imposition: as a journalist, he refuses to position himself
‘‘politically’’ in public. The following statements deal with the
impositions that accompany public presentations. Each statement
mobilises the respondent’s external role demands – either to devalue
the information given by the respondent, or to enhance its value:
Mr Murray, you are a former Ambassador of the United Kingdom. Do you
think it is right to come here and breach all these confidences in the way that you
have? [. . .] If you are engaged in this extraordinary and public breach of
confidence, how can we trust anything else that you say? (VR, 20/04/06, 11).
Another committee member, obviously a political opponent of the
first, reacts with an ‘‘upvaluing’’ question:
Mr Murray, as a career diplomat myself and former ambassador, I would like to
say that you do honour to the profession of diplomat and of diplomats of the
European Union who uphold human rights, and are not cynical (ibid.).
A further imposition relates to the fact that the CIA Committee relies
on cooperation with other institutions and inquiries. Many ‘‘guests’’ are
invited as representatives of public institutions and are thus bound to
secrecy and loyalty. External membership obligations (qua public service
law or professional ethics) come to conflict with the internal role of
‘‘guest’’. In this line, the protection of sources forms a ‘‘hard’’ pro-
fessional-ethical boundary for journalists. In the following example, this
boundary stirs up fantasies on behalf of the questioner about what the
respondent might have concealed, or might have to conceal:
Mr Grey, I want to ask you about your sources. I know you are not going to
reveal these to us, but you talked about the flight log information and said that
your source had been people involved in the network of prisons and coercive
interrogation. You therefore imply that you have spoken directly to direct
sources of information (VR, 21/03/06, 7).
The prosecutor Spataro delimits another boundary. He resists the
double imposition of ‘‘merely’’ having to comment on speculations in
his role as prosecutor:
I shall refrain from replying to the question as to whether it is likely or probable
that the Italian services could have had knowledge of what subsequently
occurred, since the work of a Public Prosecutor is not based on assessments of
probability. I work on the basis of evidence. Each one of us as a member of the
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general public and as an analyst may have his or her own opinions, but in this
formal setting I can only confirm that we have no evidence (VR, 23/02/06, 35).
Analogously, invited public servants refer to public service law and
official secrets, members of parliament to a parliamentary code of
honour, and members of other inquiry committees to ongoing
proceedings. They all confront the committee with external bound-
aries of acceptability. The same holds for the ‘‘High Representative
for the CFSP’’ (Common Foreign and Security Policy, of the EU).
Mr Solana cannot cooperate:
I am here before the European Parliament, which is an institution, and I am
speaking on behalf of the institution I represent. I have come to you to say what
I am able to tell you. Outside, as a member of the public, I will be able to tell you
exactly what I think, but here before you, who represent European sovereignty,
I, as a representative of an institution, have to tell you that which I am able to
tell you given my responsibilities (VR, 02/05/06, 7).
In competing with other membership roles and loyalties, the com-
mittee encounters narrow limits. It cannot presume cooperation – and
yet it must, since it lacks other powers.
In the Hutton Inquiry, it is relatively more difficult for witnesses to
elude the dynamics of questioning with reference to imposing questions.
Nevertheless, questions can be marked as imposing and rejected.
Sometimes, this move can succeed when witnesses refer to the pro-
cedural ‘‘drive’’. Thus, the committee’s attention to very minute details
strains witnesses’ mnemonic capacities (possibly excessively). Witnesses
regularly point out the limits to their memories (Lynch and Bogen
1996). Answers such as ‘‘I cannot remember the exact words I used’’
(Ht, 12/08/03, 56) effectively obstruct follow-up questions:
Q. Did you put some of the specific allegations that you made in the broadcast?
In the early morning broadcast, the 6 o’clock broadcast, you have referred to the
Government knowing that the 45 minute claim was wrong before it was put in.
Did you put that allegation to the Ministry of Defence press officer?
A. I do not believe I did put these specific words, no. As I say, I cannot remember
exactly what I said. I gave them an outline of the story, a summary of the story.
(Ht, 12/08/03, 62, emphases added).
Rejecting a question as ‘‘imposing’’ sometimes requires justifica-
tion. Thus, Gilligan refers to a lapse of his short-term memory:
‘‘I cannot remember exactly what I told her because it was a mobile
phone conversation and I did not take notes of that conversation’’ (Ht,
12/08/03, 56).
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Another imposition relates to the procedural aim of assessing
responsibility. Witnesses can repudiate ascriptions of responsibility
by claiming limits due to their inferior organisational status: ‘‘For
discussions on the sort of practice of the Today Programme, then you
would need to talk to higher level people than me. I am only
a reporter’’ (Ht, 12/08/03, 140).
Furthermore, witnesses can themselves appear as impositions to
the British inquiry when they provide speculations rather than first-
hand knowledge. They elude the imposing operation of the procedure
by changing to another register of knowledge. Thus, Gilligan scantily
fills in gaps in his memory with general considerations. His spec-
ulations culminate in counter-accusations. Here, Gilligan discusses
when the government might have disclosed Dr Kelly’s identity:
A. As I say, the argument that was made that that statement [by the BBC]
obliged the Government to provide clues to Dr Kelly’s identity is incorrect,
because they were already providing clues of his identity to The Times before
the statement was even issued.
Q. You have no knowledge of that.
A. Well, I mean, it is simply how newspapers work. A newspaper deadline is
roughly 6/7 o’clock in the evening; and The Times had this information for its
relevant day’s edition so it must have been provided on the afternoon or early
evening of the 8th. So there was no – you know, so that provision of clues started
before the Government spokesman on the 9th had started on the afternoon or
evening of the 8th. (Ht, 17/09/03, 65).
Gilligan bypasses the preference for eye witness accounts with expert
assumptions. The call to order ‘‘You have no knowledge of that’’ relates
to the Hutton Inquiry’s requirement that statements must be founded
in immediate cognisance, i.e. in participant knowledge. In contrast,
Gilligan here ‘‘merely’’ delivers assumptions instead of an eye witness
account.
III. Discussion: strong and weak procedures
The Hutton Inquiry and the European Parliament’s CIA Com-
mittee are procedures. In both cases, we find a certain degree of
integration, delineation, and autonomy, which in turn allows us to
conclude a measure of procedurality. Both cases pronounce judgement
on a factual situation, delimited by the terms of reference – i.e., they
display properties of procedural systems, as defined by Luhmann.
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Beyond and below this general characterisation, however, we find
different degrees of procedurality, relating to the procedure’s respect-
ive degrees of autonomy, self-reference and binding. We suggest
defining these degrees as strong or weak procedure. Based on the
processes of communication, knowledge production and decision-
making we described, the Hutton Inquiry and the CIA Committee
prove to be relatively strong or weak procedures. What can be defined
as rather strong or rather weak, then, is the self-reference of each
procedure, or the autonomy, integration and binding of each. As this
discussion shows, micro-sociological and discourse-analytical tools
can be well adapted to observe the social processes involved in ‘‘doing
procedure’’, leading to a more fine-tuned theoretical tool kit than that
generally provided by system theory without abandoning the latter’s
major theoretical foundations.
The Hutton Inquiry is integrated by participants’ far-reaching
retrospective and prospective connections. The communicative pro-
cess includes a multitude of individual hearings. Witnesses are
interrogated repeatedly, confronted with ‘‘their statements’’ and
entangled in contrasts and culminations. The participants’ performa-
tive freedom decreases in the course of the inquiry and is increasingly
replaced by participants’ own internal commitments. This dynamic
suggests a strongly integrated procedure. This is contrasted by the
hearings in the CIA Committee, which accumulate contributions and
integrate them according to issues. The respondents experience
relatively loose internal role commitments in the course of the inquiry.
Speaking to the committee, they remain true to their external
functions, and they report on circumstances beyond their own
immediate responsibility. Loose role constraints and a low threshold
for external role commitments suggest a weak procedure.
In relation to the process of knowledge production, the difference of
strong and weak is equally striking. The Hutton Inquiry develops and
administers ‘‘hard’’ tests of knowledge, including the possibility of
a witness failing the test (e.g. by becoming caught in contradictions). It
claims a monopoly regarding the terms of its investigation and refrains
from ‘‘prevarications’’ by reference to media coverage or inquiries by
other institutions. The CIA Committee provides the opposite example
of a weak procedure with a rather decentred, distributed knowledge
process. The EU Committee members ask their ‘‘guests’’ for informal
cooperation without commitment, even to assist in formulating ques-
tions or to suggest further sources of information. Their inquiry
encompasses internal and external findings. A lack of previous
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knowledge and an open knowledge process do not allow for exclusive
tests of knowledge. This in turn suggests a weak procedure.
Further dimensions of procedural strength or weakness can be
developed with regard to the decision-making process. The CIA
Committee debates a ‘‘reasonable suspicion’’ meant to justify further
investigations into the conjectured occurrences. It does not raise
questions of personal guilt and responsibility. The Hutton Inquiry,
on the other hand, does negotiate individual protagonists’ involve-
ments and actions (amongst other aspects), such as those of the
journalist in question. On this note, a strong procedure already
suggests admissions of guilt in its decision-making process. As a public
tribunal, it has a particular capacity to ‘‘hold’’ persons ‘‘responsible’’,
and also to ‘‘vindicate’’ or ‘‘clear’’ them. Its limited capacity for
judgement, in particular, leaves a weak procedure as the object of
much sneering, while a strong procedure commands respect.
The Hutton Inquiry draws hermetic boundaries and claims
autonomy. As a strong procedure, it unfolds a separate sphere of
meaning. Only in this sphere, contributions can prove their meaning,
their effectiveness and practical relevance. By comparison, the CIA
Committee remains discernibly more permeable and less binding. It
hardly constrains participants. It does not produce a sharply de-
lineated ‘‘horizon of experiences for the procedure’’ (Luhmann 1969,
p. 40, translation JS). Thus, the opposition of strong and weak does
not rely primarily on (‘‘weak or strong’’) degrees of formalisation, nor
on stages in a development (‘‘from strong to weak’’), nor on our own
quality criteria (‘‘pro strong’’). The contrasts rather denote degrees of
self-reference. Our comparison also reveals the homogeneity of the
inquiries, i.e., their composition of interdependent, non-isolable
variables. The Hutton Inquiry and the CIA Committee are both
homogenous arrangements. Taken by themselves, each is quite
effective, but also specialised and limited. In the final section, we
sketch how the procedures do also appear as heterogeneous.
IV. Outlook: interplays of strong and weak
Observers and participants sometimes criticise inquiry procedures
in light of the respective other procedural type. They reproach a weak
procedure for not producing probative force, which can usually only
be achieved by a strong procedure. They reproach a strong procedure
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for lacking the big picture, which is usually provided by a weak
procedure. In this outlook, we concern ourselves with the interplays
we observed between strong and weak procedure: the indication of
missing ‘‘strong’’ elements in ‘‘weak procedure’’ and vice versa. Next
to embedding the inquiries in larger horizons of time and meaning,
the interplays underline both participants’ and observers’ strategic
orientation and re-orientation. We observed these interplays on three
levels:
1) the participants and their actions;
2) in the press and what could be called a ‘‘bad awakening’’;
3) in the sequence of various inquiries on the same issue area.
Participants in a weak procedure sometimes utilise the standards of
knowledge of a strong procedure. ‘‘Speculations’’ are declared im-
proper by referring to the lack of binding statements, engaged
witnesses, or precise documents. In these cases, the logic behind the
interplay is that such (‘‘speculative’’) information cannot provide
a basis for accusations. Also, the ‘‘witness’’ can dismiss speculative
questions by borrowing from the strong procedure: ‘‘Please ask
specific questions!’’ An informant sticks (only) to details in order to
discourage further ‘‘weak’’ follow-up questions. In a strong pro-
cedure, participants also use these interplays: a witness attempts to
give general opinions and is rebuffed; the witness acts as an informant
in order to defuse the ‘‘strong’ interrogative situation. There are also
members on ‘‘weak’’ committees commenting negatively on their own
inquiry: ‘‘Where is the evidence! All mere assertion!’’ The interplay
also serves the political struggle. At this point, we claim that every
procedure maintains a repertoire of ways of speaking, ways of
remembering, and strategies. At the same time, each procedural type
finds provocations in the respective other procedural repertoire.
According to procedural rationality, doing one kind of procedure
involves leaving the other.
According to our first impressions, press reporters and commenta-
tors tend to follow the respective procedure’s implied methodical,
epistemic, and normative socio-logic. They adopt the inquiry’s
concerns and interests, its ‘‘drive’’, the concept of knowledge, etc.
This faithfulness to the object of their coverage holds as long as there
are news to be reported from the inquiry, i.e., as long as it is possible to
speculate on ‘‘a conspiracy’’ or on the ‘‘question of personal re-
sponsibility’’. Indeed, each procedure entices media reporting in its
very own way: once, the ‘‘big picture’’ is evoked, and once the ‘‘closely
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personal’’ comes to the fore. Once, Lord Hutton is lauded for his
artful questioning and forensic instinct; the CIA Committee, on the
other hand, legitimises reckless conspiracy theories. Reports on
‘‘strong’’ procedure take up quotes and document the exchanges of
words in detail; reports on ‘‘weak’’ procedure take up speculations,
spin them out and even outdo them. This seems to lead to the
conclusion that procedure and press go hand in hand. However, our
preliminary survey of the reports suggests another hypothesis: The
unity of procedure and press reporting dissolves quickly when an
inquiry slows down or is completed. The press suffers a ‘‘bad
awakening’’. They react with biting criticism: the ‘‘weak’’ inquiry is
criticised for not delivering evidence; supposedly it lost itself in
‘‘generalities’’. Or, conversely: the ‘‘strong’’ inquiry cannot see the
wood for the trees; it lost itself in details. The interplay dictates its
own conclusions: the inquiry should have analysed the big picture in
detail and integrated the details into the big picture. It should have
proceeded strongly and weakly at the same time.
Against this background, a third interplay is easily overlooked:
inquiry procedures alternate. They follow in sequence: a weak pro-
cedure follows a strong one, and vice versa. This interplay may be
owed to said press campaigns. Consequently, published opinion
demands the respective other type of procedure – sometimes success-
fully. The reasons for the interplay are more varied. Our short analysis
is sufficient to show that a weak procedure can prepare a strong
procedure. The former produces the classifications, connections, and
foci the latter requires. However, a weak procedure does not do so
alone. It often operates in a complex situation characterised by other
governmental and non-governmental initiatives conducting their own
research. A weak procedure can provide foundations for a strong
procedure by connecting a multitude of inquiries, similar to the
‘‘grand tour’’ (Spradley 1980) in ethnography meant to prepare
focussed observation. The weak procedure brings up facts and
responsibilities which were not discussed before. In these cases, law
courts – the mainstay of an almost archetypical strong procedure – may
take over. Similarly for a strong procedure: it creates demands for a weak
procedure. It entices curiosity about the ‘‘grand narrative’’, about the
position of an act or event in an encompassing political complex. It is
this alternation that we currently witness for both topics: the Iraq war is
today being investigated by a parliamentary committee in a weak
fashion, whereas the weak CIA inquiry is followed by a number of
strong court proceedings in EU member states.
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In this way, the interplays of strong and weak procedures remind us
of the career of issues in public debates (Luhmann 1971). The weak
procedure puts an issue on the agenda. It aims to reveal some
circumstantial knowledge and to point out impending scandals. If
a certain density of information is reached, single issues can some-
times be transformed into problems of responsibility and taken up by
a strong procedure. This is currently happening regarding the topic of
‘‘illegal detentions by the CIA’’. In reverse, a strong procedure calms
the excitement of public opinion. The public and the media await the
verdict. Subsequently, the ‘‘broader picture’’ that was left out due to
the strong procedure’s high degree of selectivity is reactivated in
a weak procedure and fed back to public attention. Further studies are
certainly required on the complex interplay of public opinion, pro-
cedural work, and democratic control.
Looking at the three interplays, our procedural analysis suggests
the following conclusion. Every procedural type has its ‘‘strengths’’
and can fulfil only certain functions: political mobilisation or legal
criminalisation. From this perspective, the (press) criticisms we cited
in the beginning can be seen as categorisation errors. One inquiry is
not the same as another inquiry, and with regard to different standards
of knowledge and demands for clarification they cannot be. However,
this insight must remain preliminary, as a short glance at German
committees of inquiry can show. Here, the ‘‘secret service committee’’
and the ‘‘inquiry committee on visas’’ seem to cultivate the interplay:
at times witnesses are called, then informants; evidence is sought next
to opinions; sometimes the inquiry culminates in determining re-
sponsibilities, and sometimes in political speculation. Also, we de-
liberately left out those manipulations, strategies and dynamics that
could be interpreted as strengthening or weakening a procedure. To
clarify these further implications of a sociological analysis of pro-
cedure, additional cases and ethnographic condensations are required.
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Resume
Prenant deux grandes enquêtes politiques, les
auteurs se posent la question de savoir si elles
peuvent être considerees comme des sys-
tèmes proceduraux au sens de la theorie de
Luhmann, c’est-à-dire des cadres d’action
bien distincts porteurs d’interpretations et
de consequences specifiques. L’un des cas
se situe en Angleterre « l’enquête Hutton »,
l’autre « l’enquête CIA » dans l’Union euro-
peenne. Un travail microsociologique rap-
porte les manières de fonctionner de l’une
et de l’autre aux modalites de construction
des processus internes de communication, de
la production de connaissances et de la prise
de decision. Il ressort que chacune produit
bien, au carrefour de ces trois processus, une
procedure coherente, plus ou moins forte et
qui fait à quelque degre système.
Mots cles : Mecanisme; Système; Enquête
parlementaire; Interaction; Discours.
Zusammenfassung
Die Autoren nehmen zwei grobe politische
Umfragen zum Anlaß, um zu erkennen, ob
sie als prozedurale Systeme im Sinne der
Luthmannschen Theorie begriffen werden
k€onnen, d.h. als Handlungsrahmen ver-
schiedener Interpretationsans€atze und mit
besonderen Konsequenzen. Der erste Fall
ist die englische Umfrage
’’
Hutton ‘‘, der
zweite die CIA Umfrage der europ€aischen
Union. Eine microsoziale Arbeit f€ordert die
Handlungsweise der einen und anderen zu
Tage : Aufbau interner Kommunikationpro-
zesse, Wissenserarbeitung und Entschei-
dungsfindung. Am Kreuzpunkt der drei
Prozesse entsteht in jedem der beiden F€alle
ein koh€arenter, mehr oder wenig starker
Wirkungsmechanismus, mit unterschiedli-
chen Ausmaßen. Letzterer sollte sowohl so-
ziologisch als auch auf seine empirische
Bef€ahigung und als Variante systemtheore-
tischer Aussagen begriffen werden.
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